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A Right of Passage: The Implications of the Tenth
Circuit’s Ruling in First Unitarian v. Salt Lake City
I. INTRODUCTION
The classic “bundle of sticks” metaphor in property law holds that
property is, in essence, a bundle of rights that can be severed, sold,
bequeathed, or devised. This analogy “is a combination of Wesley
Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and A.M. Honoré’s description of the
incidents of ownership.”1 Hohfeld argues that property rights are a
culmination of individual rights valid against all other owners. Honoré
described property law not only as the rights associated with owning
property but the duties, liabilities, and other aspects associated with
owning property; thus, property is not only a list of rights, but a
culmination of relations and obligations.2 Scholars disagree about all the
rights included in the bundle, but those most commonly identified
“include the right to exclude others, the right to possess, the right to use,
and the right to alienate (or transfer or dispose of).”3
The question raised in First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v.
Salt Lake City Corp. is whether a city can retain and restrict a stick in the
bundle of property rights in a publicly held street that is sold to a private
entity. More specifically, does a city have the “authority to prohibit all
expressive activities on a public easement it reserved across otherwise
private property, except for the speech permitted by the private owner of
the underlying estate?”4 In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that Main Street Plaza in downtown Salt Lake
City, a privately owned park that was a former street, is a public forum
and, therefore, a restrictive easement placed on the Plaza violated the
First Amendment.
After providing the background and context for First Unitarian, this
note will address the right of states to create restrictive easements and the
interrelation between the First Amendment and property rights in Utah.
1. J. E. Penner, “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996).
2. Id. at 713.
3. Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 285-286 (2002).
4. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1121
(10th Cir. 2002).
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In section IV, the comment will look at First Amendment analysis of the
forum doctrine and its application in a marquee Tenth Circuit case:
Hawkins v. City & County of Denver. This section will also include an
analysis of the Second Circuit’s competing conclusion in Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks
& Recreation. In section V, the Note will challenge the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning in reaching the conclusion that Main Street Plaza should be
considered a public forum. In addition, the Note will discuss the
implications of the ruling and the ramifications for the future of both
government property rights and individual First Amendment rights in the
Tenth Circuit. Through examining First Unitarian it will be shown that
the Tenth Circuit’s ruling is too far reaching and that governments
should be able to terminate public forums while retaining a non-public
forum easement.
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF FIRST UNITARIAN V. SALT LAKE
CITY
A. History of the Case
On April 13, 1999, the Salt Lake City Council approved the closure
and sale of a portion of Main Street to The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (“the Church”) subject to a restrictive easement.5 The
easement was “planned and improved so as to maintain, encourage, and
invite public use.”6 The City of Salt Lake (“the City”) recorded a
warranty deed and reservation of easement that included the right of the
Church to prevent uses of the property other than pedestrian use. The
deed restricted certain forms of speech, lewd conduct, and activities such
as smoking, skateboarding, and rollerblading.7 Those opposed to the
5. Alan Edwards, S.L. Plaza Gets Green Light: Council Votes to Sell 2-Acre Stretch to LDS
Church, DESERET NEWS, April 14, 1999, at A1.
6. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 191).
7. Id. at 1118-1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 362).
The reservation contains the following restrictions with respect to the use of the
easement: 2.2 Right to Prevent Uses Other Than Pedestrian Passage. Nothing in the
reservation of use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a public forum,
limited or otherwise on the Property. Nothing in this easement is intended to permit any
of the following enumerated or similar activities on the Property: loitering, assembling,
partying, demonstrating, picketing, distributing literature, soliciting, begging, littering,
consuming alcohol beverages or using tobacco products, sunbathing, carrying firearms
(except for police personnel), erecting signs or displays, using loudspeakers or other
devices to project music, sound or spoken messages, engaging in any illegal, offensive,
indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct, or otherwise
disturbing the peace. Grantee shall have the right to deny access to the Property to
persons who are disorderly or intoxicated or engaging in any of the activities identified
above. The provisions of this section are intended to apply only to Grantor and other
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restrictions filed suit against the City claiming a violation of the First
Amendment.8 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) represented
those who opposed the reservation of easement, claiming that the City
gave preferential treatment to the Church in violation of the First
Amendment. The Church intervened as a party to the suit.9
To understand why the First Unitarian Church and the ACLU were
so adamantly opposed to the restrictions placed on the easement, the
underlying social climate of Salt Lake City must be examined. Salt Lake
City is the world headquarters for the Church which was the driving
force behind the settlement of Utah and the establishment of Salt Lake
City. Consequently, the Church and its members have wielded
significant influence over the social and political atmosphere in Salt Lake
City. Over time, a rift has grown between some members and some nonmembers of the Church who feel that the Church improperly wields
influence over local government leaders in order to foster its own
position. In the case at issue, Stephen Clark, counsel for the Salt Lake
chapter of the ACLU, stated that the restrictions placed on the easement
resulted in the City of Salt Lake “essentially preferring one religion over
others” and that Salt Lake leaders gave “the indelible impression that the
LDS Church occupies a privileged position in the community and that
the City endorses the LDS Church and its messages, without any secular
purpose.”10 The ACLU also points to the fact that a majority of the Salt
Lake City Council members belong to the Church and that all of them
approved of the easement.11 The City of Salt Lake has sold property to
other churches while retaining easements in the past,12 but it is this
underlying tension with the Church that establishes the backdrop for
First Unitarian.

users of the easement and are not intended to limit or restrict Grantee’s use of the
Property as owner thereof, including, without limitation, the distribution of literature, the
erection of signs and displays by Grantee, and the projection of music and spoken
messages by Grantee.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155
(D. Utah 2001) (naming The First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, Utahns for Fairness, Utah
National Organization for Women, and Craig S. Axford as plaintiffs in the suit).
9. Id.
10. Rebecca Walsh, ACLU Suit Says City Railroaded LDS Easement, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
March 2, 2000, at D3.
11. Mormons Purchase Portion of Utah Public Street, Create Code of Conduct, AP, May 5,
1999, available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=8668.
12. Salt Lake City Attorney Defends Sale of Street to Mormon Church, AP, May 5, 1999,
available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=8650 (Salt Lake
City Attorney Roger Cutler noting that since 1986, the city has sold portions of over forty-nine city
streets for a value of $1.8 million. Included were sales to the Catholic, Baptist and Lutheran
churches.)
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At the district court level, summary judgment was granted for the
City on all counts stating that the property had so changed through the
sale of the property, as to extinguish the public forum and thus create a
non-public forum.13 District Judge Stewart also determined that the
restrictions placed upon the property were content neutral, and, therefore,
the restrictions placed on the easement did not violate the First
Amendment.14 Judge Stewart, speaking of the case, stated that “[t]his
raises serious concerns about the plaintiffs’ free speech rights and private
property rights. But in this case, we have a party that has paid fair market
value and expended considerable money to alter the property. Free
speech rights do not outweigh private property rights.”15 The case was
appealed to the Tenth Circuit who disagreed with Judge Stewart’s ruling
and analysis of the case.16
B. Reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in First Unitarian v. Salt Lake City
The Tenth Circuit found that “[e]ither government ownership or
regulation is sufficient for a First Amendment forum of some kind to
exist.”17 The Tenth Circuit ignored the City’s property law contentions
and Judge Stewart’s analysis and went to the First Amendment forum
analysis implying that a deed does not free the government from
constitutional analysis when it is a party to an easement.18 The court also
rejected the language of the restrictive easement that indicated the intent
of the parties not to create a public forum19 stating that “[t]he
government cannot simply declare the First Amendment status of
property regardless of its nature and its public use.”20
The Court ruled that it need only decide the nature of the government
forum and, contrary to Stewart who looked at the purpose of the
surrounding plaza, restricted its analysis to the nature and purpose of the
easement stating that it was the only government interest in the
property.21 The court utilized the objective considerations outlined in
13. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1166, 1170-72 (D. Utah 2001) (Judge Stewart relied upon Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992) cited in Hawkins v.
City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999)).
14. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-79.
15. Rebecca Walsh, Judge Rejects Suit Against Plaza Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 3, 2001,
at A1.
16. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1114.
17. Id. at 1122.
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES §3.1 cmt. d (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
19. See supra note 7.
20. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1124.
21. Id. at 1125.
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee to determine the nature of the easement as a
forum.22 The considerations include 1) whether the property retains
similar characteristics of public forms, 2) whether government has
granted or acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and 3)
whether expressive activity would interfere with the intended
government use of the property.23 The Tenth Circuit then sought to
“determine the easement’s nature and purpose” while answering the
question “whether expressive activity is compatible with the purposes
and uses to which the government has lawfully dedicated the property,
not whether the government has expressly designated speech as a
purpose of the property.”24
The court, after careful analysis, concluded that the easement was
intended to be used as a “pedestrian throughway for the general
public.”25 The court claimed that the City’s main purposes were to create
public space in the downtown area and to generate more pedestrian
traffic. The court also felt that the City meant to retain these rights even
while selling the underlying land as seen through a reverter clause in the
contract.26 The court stated that the Salt Lake City planning council had
discussed the issue and had indicated that it would require the Church to
regulate speech as it would in a public park.27 The court further
determined that the City’s sale of the land was contingent on several
factors including a provision that the easement should be “planned and
improved so as to maintain, encourage, and invite public use.”28 The
court focused on the City’s argument that the City would not have sold
the land “but for” the easement.29 The court also rejected the notion that
the easement was for ingress and egress to the Church’s two campuses
that straddle the Main Street Plaza30 as well as the argument that since
Main Street had been turned over the restrictions on the easement had
been limited.31 Ultimately, the court found that the easement was a public

22. Id.
23. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125.
25. Id. at 1126.
26. Id. at 1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 362) (The reverter clause states that if the
Church “fails to use the Property for the purposes set forth . . . or fails to maintain the property
thereafter” ownership may revert back to the City).
27. Id. at 1128.
28. Id. at 1126.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1126-27.
31. Id. at 1129-1130.
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forum and, therefore, the restrictions placed on the land violate the First
Amendment.32
III. EASEMENT PROPERTY RIGHT LAW
A. General Concepts of Servitudes and Easements in Property Law
The Restatement (Third) of Property provides a guideline into
generally held property principles including servitudes.33 A servitude is a
“legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or an
interest in land”34 that includes easements or “a nonpossessory right to
enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”35
An easement is considered a non-possessory right because it “authorizes
limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose. The holder
of the easement or profit is entitled to make only the uses reasonably
necessary for the specified purpose.36
Government agencies have increasingly used privately created
servitudes to supplement “public land-use controls and environmental
protections, shifting development costs to the private sector, and
providing controls and governance structures for development and
redevelopment projects”37 in order to maximize the public good. Courts
and legislatures have traded looking at rigid constraints on servitudes
into “recognizing a general freedom to create servitudes”38 and “[w]here
servitudes are clearly intended, and do not appear to be obstructing
useful development, courts frequently apply a stronger constructional
preference in favor of interpreting a servitude to carry out the intent and
expectations of the parties.”39 It is recognized, however, that servitudes
created by a governmental entity need to be reviewed under

32. Id. at 1130.
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 3.1, cmt. a (recognizing that the purpose of the
Restatement (Third) of Property is to “identify more accurately the situations in which the threatened
risks of harm to the general welfare justify judicial intervention to invalidate properly created
transactions intended to create interests that run with land.”).
34. Id. at § 1.1(1).
35. Id. at § 1.2(1). There are several types of easements including non-exclusive easements
(those that allow servitude holder to exclude anyone except the servient owner or those authorized
by the servient owner) and exclusive easements (where the servient owner is excluded from certain
uses of the land except those that do not unreasonably interfere with uses of the servitude). Id. at §
1.2(1), cmt. c.
36. Id. at § 1.2(1), cmt. d.
37. Id. at § 3.1, cmt. a.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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constitutional law and if determined to violate fundamental constitutional
rights, are subject to invalidation.40
B. Utah Property Law
Utah statutes allow the state to sell public land for the public
benefit.41 Additionally, it is generally held that “the right to control a
[government-owned] servitude for the benefit of the public is located in
the state.”42 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the words of a deed
or grant determine the scope of an easement, burdening the servient
estate only to the purposes expressed in the grant.43 Utah has established
that deeds “should be construed so as to effectuate the intentions and
desires of the parties, as manifested by the language made use of in the
deed . . . . [W]hen the deed creates an easement the circumstances
attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be
attained are also to be considered.” 44 Utah State Law has also held that
“once the character of the easement has been fixed no material change or
enlargement of the right acquired can be made if thereby a greater burden
is placed on the servient estate.”45 It, therefore, may be argued that courts
cannot “expand the terms of the easement”46 and thereby trump state law
by allowing the easement use to be incompatible with the possessory
estate’s main use.
Though it has been argued that the easement is not a significant
enough property right to require a constitutional analysis,47 the court
determined that a constitutional analysis is appropriate whenever there is
“government ownership or regulation.”48 However, the intent of the
parties should be construed liberally,49 and, in this case, the court has
40. Id. at § 3.1, cmt. d.
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-4-1(1) (2003) (“All state agencies may acquire land . . . and are
authorized to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land no longer needed for public purposes . . . .”).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 2.18(2) & cmt. b.
43. Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963); Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d
225, 227 (Utah 1985) (“[T]he law in this state is plain: A right of way founded on a deed or grant is
limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument.”).
44. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1952).
45. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1945), modified on
other grounds, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946) (holding that a ditch company with irrigation ditches
across individuals’ land could not cement the ditches because the envisioned purpose of the ditches
was to include seepage of water to landowner’s surrounding land).
46. Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227 (holding that restrictions placed on an easement only for a right
of way to egress and ingress to cleaning out a ditch, were the only purposes and uses for the right of
way).
47. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002).
48. Id.
49. But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (The Supreme Court noting that
the government could not transform the sidewalks around the Supreme Court into a non-public
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overlooked the intention of both parties as manifested in the Deed of
Reservation of the Easement. Additionally, the court, in its First
Amendment analysis, failed to look at the purposes of the servient estate
or the Church’s intended use of the Main Street Plaza. The court then
incorrectly labeled the Main Street Plaza a public forum although a
public forum was clearly beyond the intent of the parties to the
agreement.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. An Overview of First Amendment Rights with Regard to Public
Forums
The character of the property in issue determines the standard for
evaluating such property.50 The purpose of a forum analysis is to
determine whether the government’s purpose in limiting the proposed
speech on a property outweighs private individual uses of the property.51
There are three traditional designations for forums when dealing with the
First Amendment: traditional public forums, government designated
public forums, and non-public forums.52 Traditional public forums are
those places that “by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate” in which “the rights of the State to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”53 Streets and parks have
traditionally “been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”54 In these public
forums, the government cannot prohibit all communication.55
The second designation, government designated public forums,
refers to forums that have not traditionally been public forums but have
been set aside by the government as public forums. Government
designated public forums are “governed by different standards . . . [as]
the ‘First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply
because it is owned or controlled by the government.’”56 The “state may
forum by creating a statute). Grace is distinguishable from First Unitarian in that government
retained possession of the land whereas the title to the Plaza was sold to a private third party. There
is no statutory limitation placed on the land, except that the land is sold for its fair market value.
50. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
51. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
52. Id. at 802.
53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
54. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
56. Id. at 46 (citing United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114,
129 (1981)).
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reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”57 The government, like private property owners, has the right to
preserve property for lawfully dedicated purposes.58
The last designation consists of forums that are either nonpublic
forums or not forums. The restrictions in this group have to be
“reasonable” in light of the purpose of the forum and such that public
officials are not seeking to suppress an individual’s views that they
oppose.59
In summary, the government must permit speech in public forums.
The government can open up additional public forums for a specific use
and it may retain property that is not designated as a public forum. A key
distinction in determining between a public forum and a non-public
forum is that the former requires “general access” while the latter permits
“selective access.”60 Neither side disputes the fact that the Main Street
corridor was a traditional public forum before the sale.61 The dispute
arises around the nature of the property after the sale.62
B. Eliminating a Public Forum
As the Tenth Circuit noted in its opinion, Justice Kennedy set forth
the three ways to terminate a public forum in his concurring opinion in
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.63 The three
ways are 1) selling the property; 2) changing the property’s physical
characteristics; or 3) changing the property’s principle use.64 The use of
the word “or” signifies a “totality of the circumstances” analysis to
determine whether a forum has been eliminated.65 Justice Kennedy
posited that the government retains the right to close a public forum as
“[o]therwise the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or
eliminating a street or sidewalk, which no one has understood the public
57. Id.
58. United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-130 (1981).
59. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
60. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (quoting
Cornelius 473 U.S. at 803, 805).
61. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1165 (D. Utah 2001).
62. Id.
63. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Lee, 505 U.S. at 699-700).
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forum doctrine to require.”66 In determining whether property retains its
public forum status, the overarching test is that if the “objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and
uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive
activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses” then the
property should be considered a public forum.67 In determining
“objective” and “physical characteristics,” the most important
considerations a court should look to include whether the “property
shares physical similarities with more traditional public for[a], whether
the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the
property, and whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a
significant way with the uses to which the government has, as a factual
matter, dedicated the property.”68
C. Hawkins v. City and County of Denver: The Tenth Circuit’s
Prevailing Precedent in Forum Analysis
Hawkins v. City and County of Denver is the prevailing case in the
Tenth Circuit dealing with forum analysis and the elimination of public
forums.69 The Galleria is a 600-foot glass-covered converted public street
owned by the City of Denver.70 It is flanked on both sides by three
performing arts theaters and a public parking garage that are part of the
Denver Performing Arts Complex (DPAC). To the north of the Galleria
is a public access street (Fourteenth Street) and, to the south is a
sculpture park that separates the DPAC from Speer Boulevard.71 The
court in Hawkins noted that the Galleria serves as “an extended lobby for
the various performing arts venues.”72 A group of musicians representing
a local musicians’ guild protesting on the Galleria was removed by
Denver Police. However, the demonstrating musicians were allowed to
carry on their protest on Fourteenth Street which the city considered to
be a public forum.73 The City of Denver admitted that the Galleria was
open to the public74 and the court recognized “[p]ublicly owned or
operated property does not become a ‘public forum’ simply because

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Lee, 505 U.S. at. 699-700 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Hawkins, 170 F.3d 1281.
Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1287.
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members of the public are permitted to come and go at will.”75 The court,
however, ruled that the DPAC was a nonpublic forum because it was not
a public park or analogous to a public thoroughfare.76 The mere fact the
Galleria was constructed on a former public street does not render it a
traditional public forum for the “government may, by changing the
physical nature of its property, alter it to such an extent that it no longer
retains its public forum status.”77
The musicians’ guild claimed that the city’s restrictions favored
some speech over others. The court stated that the speech was limited to
that associated with the city owned DPAC78 and that leafleting and
expressing one’s views was at “odds with the DPAC’s limited purpose as
an entertainment venue.”79 The court also noted that the reasonableness
of the restrictions was bolstered by the fact that up to fifty percent of the
DPAC patrons entered the facilities using public sidewalks thus giving
the plaintiffs other forums in which to disseminate their message.80
D. Differing Opinions: The Second Circuit’s Forum Analysis in Hotel
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Department of
Parks & Recreation
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit’s October 9, 2002 decision, the
Second Circuit decided a factually similar case. In Hotel Employees &
Restaurant Employees Union of New York Department of Parks &
Recreation, the Second Circuit concluded that Lincoln Plaza, a venue
owned by New York City but maintained by a private entity, Lincoln
Center Inc., was not a public forum even though there was a public
thoroughfare across the plaza.81
A local Union wanted to hold a rally on Lincoln Plaza. The Union’s
application was denied by Lincoln Center, Inc. because “the proposed
use violated its policy against non-arts related events in the Plaza.”82 The
court held that the private entity’s ban “limiting organized public
expression in the Plaza to artistic and performance-related events” did
not violate the First Amendment.83 The court, in distinguishing between
a public and non-public forum, examined the characteristic of the forum,
75. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 686 (1992)(O’Conner
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
76. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1288.
79. Id. at 1291.
80. Id. at 1291 n.7.
81. 311 F.3d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 542.
83. Id. at 556.
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the property’s use including location and purpose,84 the purpose for
constructing the space, the regulations placed upon the property,85 and
the traditional use of the property.86 In analyzing the forum issue, the
court refused to consider the ‘throughfare’ across Lincoln Plaza in
isolation, but instead analyzed the Plaza as an entire entity.87
Through its forum analysis, the court determined that the city did not
intend to treat Lincoln Plaza as a city park.88 Though one of the
underlying purposes of Lincoln Plaza was to create a set of “parks and
pedestrian thoroughfares,” this goal was never adopted as official policy
and, therefore, was considered by the court to be a description rather than
a legal conclusion.89 The Union argued that people often used Lincoln
Plaza for purposes other than for simply accessing Lincoln Center and
that the walkway through Lincoln Plaza was designed to be one of the
“major thoroughfares” for the city.90 The court stated that even though
the Lincoln Plaza has characteristics similar to those of a thoroughfare,
the “location” and “purpose” of the Lincoln Plaza must still be
examined.91 The court thought Lincoln Plaza to be the centerpiece of the
Lincoln complex and even though the complex was designed to be open
to passers-by “[t]he ability of pedestrians to cross the Plaza as a short-cut
between surrounding streets is merely an incidental feature of its
principal function as the entrance plaza for the Lincoln Center
complex.”92 The court recognized that those who enter the Plaza have
“entered some special type of enclave.”93 This enclave did not diminish
individual access to surrounding parks that are open to public expression,
thus indicating that the Plaza had a limited purpose.94 Additionally,
because Lincoln Plaza is not surrounded by government buildings, it is
“easily distinguished from those plazas and squares in which political
84. Id. at 547.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Id. at 546-47.
88. Id at 548. (“[T]he Parks Department retains exclusive scheduling authority over
neighboring Damrosch and Dante Parks and permits organized expression in those parks. In
contrast, Lincoln Center, Inc., as the City’s licensee, has limited organized public speech in the plaza
to events having an artistic or performance-related component.”) Id. at 549.
89. Id. at 549 n.11. (noting that a Lincoln Center document entitled “Plaza Policy & Usage
Guidelines Revised Draft” was never adopted as official policy of the center and therefore does not
prove intent)
90. Id. at 550.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)).
94. Id. at 551. See also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992) (“[S]eparation from acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated
property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction.”)
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speech has historically been protected.”95 The Court concluded that, in
considering the “relevant factors,”96 permitting all types of expressive
activity “would be incompatible with its ‘intended purpose’ and ‘how the
locale is used.’”97
V. FORUM ANALYSIS – FIRST UNITARIAN V. CITY OF SALT LAKE
The Tenth Circuit’s ruling in First Unitarian that an easement is a
public forum98 has implicitly extended the scope of the First Amendment
while significantly limiting state authority over property rights.99 The
court has trumped Utah state law allowing the creation of an easement
that is not bound by rights reserved in the deed and, ultimately, the intent
of the parties. The Tenth Circuit’s decision is troublesome, as it
supercedes state property law while unduly burdening the government
entities’ ability to sell public land while trying to maximize public good.
A. Treatment of the Main Street Plaza as a Public Forum
1. The former public forum status should be eliminated through
reservation of deed.
The City and the Church agreed that “[n]othing in the reservation of
use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a public
forum, limited or otherwise on the Property.”100 The agreement also
established that the easement was to be solely for “pedestrian access and
passage.”101 The Tenth Circuit, in considering this issue, insisted that a
government entity cannot determine the nature of the forum for First
Amendment rights regardless of the nature or use of the venue. The court
took the position that a First Amendment forum analysis must be
performed any time a government interest, including regulation and
ownership, is at issue, regardless of express language in the parties’

95. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 552.
96. Id. (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998)).
97. Id. (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition
Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982)).
98. Note that the court stated its intent was not to hold that the First Amendment applies to
all easements, but only that the easement is open to scrutiny based upon the characteristics of the
easement, forum principles, and context of each particular case. Id. at 1123 n.5. However, the ruling
has effectively resulted in a per se result.
99. Id.
100. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1160 (D. Utah 2001) (quoting Warranty Deed at 1-3).
101. Id. at 1160 (quoting Special Warranty Deed at §1.3).
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agreement to the contrary.102 However, the court took it upon itself in
both Hawkins and First Unitarian to determine the nature of the property
through a forum analysis, trying to determine what the intentions of the
city were in creating the easement.103
The result of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling is that there is no certainty for
government entities when contracting to create easements to determine
the scope of property rights, in particular easements. As the Tenth Circuit
indicated, its intention was not to hold that the First Amendment applies
to all easements, but that easements are open to scrutiny based upon the
characteristics of the easement, forum principles, and context of each
particular case.104 Though parties who feel their constitutional rights have
been violated should be afforded a day in court, the Tenth Circuit’s
ruling provides no safe-harbor for government entities to work within
when reserving easements. Even if the government entity specifically
outlines in the Reservation of Deed of Easement that nothing more than
“pedestrian access and passage” are intended, 105 the government must
await a ruling from the courts to determine whether its intentions will be
upheld. Parties, therefore, are left to the determination of the court. In the
process of trumping settled state law, the Tenth Circuit has failed to
outline what government entities can do to guarantee pedestrian access
while not encroaching on the servient estate’s rights.106 By not honoring
the express statements in the Reservation of Deed, the Tenth Circuit
leaves both the government entity and buyer of property with uncertainty
whether their intentions will be honored. Thus, the ruling undermines the
government’s ability to plan and utilize public land to maximize the
public good.
It is settled Utah Law that a servient estate should only be burdened
to the extent of the deed,107 for to deem otherwise would diminish
individual ability to contract. As Judge Stewart noted, the Church should
not be penalized for paying fair market value for burdened property108
102. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122-1123 (10th Cir.
2002).
103. The Supreme Court has indicated that a government entity can create a designated public
forum. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing United States
Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
104. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 n.5.
105. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1160 (D. Utah 2001).
106. See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1131. (The Tenth Circuit stated that if the City
wanted to retain an easement “the City must permit speech on the easement. Otherwise, it must
relinquish the easement so the parcel becomes entirely private.” In effect, the Tenth Circuit has
stated that First Amendment considerations trump government entities’ rights when contracting for
easements across private land.)
107. See supra note 44.
108. Walsh, supra note 10, at A1.
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because it was not the intent of the City or the Church to extend the
easement beyond “pedestrian access and passage.”109 The Church would
not have purchased Main Street had it known it would be unable to
maintain the same restrictions as it does upon the rest of its Church
campus which flanks Main Street.110 The Tenth Circuit provides no
convincing argument to support the proposition that First Amendment
rights automatically trump a government agency’s right to contract the
scope of the forum in a reservation of deeds. The court simply stated that
if there is unconstitutional action, then the property right should be
eliminated or changed into a form that is not unconstitutional.111 The
court then incorrectly classified the Plaza as a public forum and thereby
invalidated the express language of the deed as a violation of free speech.
By doing so, the court trumped state property rights and diminished the
government’s ability to contract, all under the banner of the First
Amendment.
2. The former public forum was eliminated with a non-public forum
taking its place
Even if the notion that the government cannot limit the scope of the
easement by deed is rejected, the Court still erred in its forum analysis. It
is not disputed that before Main Street was sold it was a public forum.112
The dispute centers around whether the three prongs of Justice
Kennedy’s test have been satisfied: that of selling the property, changing
the property’s physical characteristics, and/or changing the property’s
principle use.113
a. Selling the property. In the Hawkins case, the city retained control
over the entire plaza thus not selling or conveying any rights to a third
party.114 In Hotel Employees, the city retained the rights to Lincoln Plaza
but allowed a third party corporation, Lincoln Center Inc., to maintain
the premises, including the scheduling of events.115 Clearly in both of
these instances the first prong of Justice Kennedy’s analysis has not been

109. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
110. Transcript, Salt Lake City Planning Commission Meeting, March 4, 1999 at 45. (on file
with author) (Church attorney stated that it was crucial to the Church to protect the interests on the
adjoining Church properties).
111. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1122.
112. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
113. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698-700 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
114. Brief for Appellee at 6-7, First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, en banc denied.
115. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks
&Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 541 (2nd Cir. 2002).
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met, that of selling the property, yet both these Courts determined that a
non-public forum exists.
b. Changing the property’s physical characteristics. The Tenth Circuit
limited its review of the physical characteristics and property’s principle
use to that of the easement rather than examining the characteristics of
the servient estate (the Plaza now owned by the Church). The court
states “it is the purpose of the easement, the property that is a forum of
some type, and not the purpose of the Church Plaza, the surrounding
property, that is at issue.”116 However, it is clear from both Hawkins and
Hotel Employees that in the interest of completeness both interests of the
servitude and servient owners need to be addressed. In Hawkins, the
court did not limit its analysis to individuals’ ability to cross, or “cut
through” the plaza, but examined the nature of the DPAC as a whole.117
Again in Hotel Employees, the court looked at the characteristics of the
entire Lincoln Complex. By limiting the analysis to a non-possessory
interest such as the easement alone, it is clear that no physical
characteristics can be ascertained. The court was, therefore, able to
avoid meeting the second prong of the Kennedy test. The court simply
stated that the easement has many similarities to a sidewalk that has
traditionally been held to be a public forum.118 However, the court should
not just make a broad characterization of all easements as maintaining
the same physical characteristics as sidewalks. There are numerous
examples of easements that do not constitute sidewalks such as running
utility lines across individuals’ property. It is necessary to look at the
easement in light of its surroundings to properly balance First
Amendment and private property rights.
Upon examining the changes that have taken place on Main Street, it
is clear that a “special type of enclave” has been established.119 The
Church, at its own expense, removed the street and sidewalks. The
Church’s name is conspicuously displayed on all entrances, there are
many religious sculptures and images presented, and there is a large
reflecting pool in front of the LDS temple.120 No remnants of the former
sidewalk or street exist. Instead, “reddish-grey granite pavers” now cover
the Plaza.121 Additionally, the Church placed streetlights and garbage
cans on the Plaza that are identical to those on the surrounding church
116. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1128.
117. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 6-7.
118. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1129.
119. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 550 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180
(1983).
120. Brief for Appellee, supra at note 114, at 3.
121. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1167 (D. Utah 2001).
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campus.122 These changes indicate that this Plaza is not a public property
but an ecclesiastical park that serves as an extension of the Church’s
downtown religious campus with the Church’s Temple and World
Headquarters flanking the Plaza.123
The changes made on Main Street Plaza are consistent with those
made on the Galleria in Hawkins. The Tenth Circuit court, however,
argues that the nature of the property in Hawkins was changed because
the street dead-ended into a park and not because a public street was
converted into a 600-foot glass Galleria.124 However, the term dead end
is never mentioned in the Hawkins decision125 and the court in Hawkins
looked at physical changes to the entire DPAC.126 By ignoring the vast
physical changes made on the Plaza, the Tenth Circuit has ignored the
Hawkins precedent.
c. Changing the property’s principle use. The main thrust of the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis focuses on the third prong of Justice Kennedy’s
test, though one prong of the analysis should carry no more weight than
any other prong.127 The notion that the property’s principle use should be
limited to that of a public thoroughfare rather than the use for which the
Church purchased the property is improper and both the City and
Church’s purpose behind the Plaza should be examined.
The First Unitarian court distinguishes Hawkins by arguing that the
main purpose of the Galleria was for ingress and egress into the DPAC128
and that the Plaza’s main purpose is for pedestrian traffic.129 From the
language of the deed it is clear that the City and Church did not intend
for anything more than mere “pedestrian access and passage”130 across
the Plaza: otherwise the reservation would not specify that “[n]othing in
the reservation of use of this easement shall be deemed to create or
constitute a public forum.”131 The court implicitly refutes the specific
intention of the deed to restrict certain activities by stating that the City
first proposed that speech on the Plaza should not be more restrictive

122. Id.
123. See supra note 75 (the Tenth Circuit in Hawkins noted that the mere crossing of the plaza
by pedestrians does not mean that a public forum exists).
124. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1130.
125. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 7.
126. Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 1287 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
686 (1992)).
128. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1127.
129. Id. at 1128.
130. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1167 (D. Utah 2001) (quoting Warranty Deed at 1-3).
131. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1118-1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol II at 362).
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than a public park.132 However, this proposal came up during a planning
commission meeting in which an individual suggested, after approving of
the proposed Plaza, that restrictions should not be greater than a public
park.133 But this proposal was simply part of the Planning Commission’s
recommendation to the City Council and was not adopted in the final
agreement approved by the City Council.134 As in Hotel Employees, if
something is not adopted as official policy of the governing body then it
should not constitute a legal conclusion.135 A mere discussion should not
be used to trump the unambiguous language of the deed showing that
nothing more than passage was intended.
The court also stated that “but for” the easement the City would not
have entered into the agreement with the Church.136 Statements made by
Salt Lake City attorney Roger Cutler to the ACLU showed that, for the
City, the sale of the property was never contingent on the easement.
Cutler stated that, if forced to choose, “the [C]ity would elect to deed the
easement to the purchaser, rather than face a remitter of all or any of the
purchase price because of a claim of recession or deed reformation due to
a mistake of fact and/or law on the forum status of this property.”137 The
result would be the City would give up any rights it had to the Plaza.138 It
was also recognized that the City asked for the easement to appease
critics who thought that the Church might not allow individuals to cross
the Plaza, 139 not because City leaders’ felt “there was a legitimate need
for the easement.”140 This also refutes the contention that the reverter
clause was in place to guarantee the rights of the citizens. It was instead
intended only to appease certain critics to the Plaza, not as an indication
of the main purpose of the Plaza as a pedestrian thoroughfare. The Tenth
Circuit even acknowledged that the “City has attempted to change the
forum’s status”141 as the “City Council knew, understood, and acquiesced
in the terms of a limited public access easement, including the fact that it
was not to constitute or be used as a public forum.”142 It is clear that the
132. Id. at 1128.
133. Transcript, Salt Lake City Planning Comm’n Meeting, supra note 110, at 37.
134. Transcript, Salt Lake City Council Meeting, April 13 1999 at 78-79.
135. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks
&Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 549 (2nd Cir. 2002)
136. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126.
137. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney for the City of Salt Lake, to Stephen C. Clark
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc. (June 9, 1999).
138. Brady Snyder, Letters Dispute Plaza Stance, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 27, 2002, at A1.
139. Letter from Roger F. Cutler to Stephen C. Clark, supra note 137.
140. Brady Snyder, supra note 138, at A01.
141. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1131.
142. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney for the City of Salt Lake, to Stephen C. Clark
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc. (May 17, 1999).
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main purpose of the Plaza was not to increase the pedestrian flow of
traffic, but as an extension of the Church’s campus and ingress and
egress to the Church’s facilities.
The court reasoned that because the City and the Church planned for
and encouraged public use, the main purpose of the Plaza was for
pedestrian ingress and egress across the Plaza and not ingress and egress
to Church facilities flanking the Plaza.143 The court, in making such a
conclusion, was clearly not examining the actual use of the Plaza. In fact,
the Salt Lake transportation board noted that the majority of people who
utilize Main Street Plaza do so to access adjacent church buildings144 and
if there was no easement across the Plaza the impact on pedestrian travel
would be minimal as individuals would have to travel only an extra onethird of a mile.145 It was estimated that between 19,000 and 30,000
individuals utilize the Plaza to reach Church owned properties daily as
opposed to a much more minimal amount that actually walk through the
property.146 The Plaza can be compared to Lincoln Plaza in the fact that
the public can “wander through the [C]hurch [P]laza, but most go there
as a destination or to get to other [C]hurch buildings”147 as people can
wander through Lincoln Plaza, but go there to access the entertainment
and artistic facilities.
In summary, the Tenth Circuit felt that “the district court erred in
considering whether speech activities were compatible with an
‘ecclesiastical park.’ Providing for a religious park is the purpose of the
surrounding Plaza property, not the easement, and must be the Church’s
purpose, rather than the [C]ity’s.”148 In speaking during the approving
phases of the Plaza, Church President Gordon B. Hinckley stated “[t]his
beautiful place will inspire faith where now there is asphalt and moving
cars.”149 Clearly, however, it was not only the Church’s desire to create a
“beautiful place” downtown; the City also recognized the value of the
Church’s Plaza. Salt Lake City Council Chairman Bryce Jolley stated,
“[e]verything will be improved with that plaza. . . . It not only improves
the landscape and architecture around there, but it [also] brings more

143. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126-27.
144. Heather May, Advisory Board Backs City’s Plaza Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB., March 5,
2003, at B2.
145. Heather May, Take the Deal, Abandon Easement on Plaza, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 5,
2003, at B5.
146. Rebecca Walsh, Fight Over Main Street Plaza Down to Meaning of ‘Sidewalk’, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Dec. 19, 2000, at B2.
147. Heather May, Sides in Plaza Suit Eye NYC Case, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec.14, 2002, at B1.
148. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128
n.10 (10th Cir. 2002).
149. Rebecca Walsh, New Plaza Proposed on Main, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec 2, 1998, at A1.
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people to downtown Salt Lake City, building the business community,
restaurants, retailers and hotels.”150 The City was not in a position to
accomplish this and so it solicited the Church to create the downtown
Plaza as an extension of its campus.151
B. Implications of Classifying a Public Forum: The Burden on
Government Entities’ Ability to Sell Public Land and Maximize Public
Good
As the preamble to the Constitution points out, one of the underlying
purposes of government is to “promote the general welfare” of its
citizens.152 In fulfilling this charge, government entities often sell public
land to generate revenue to foster the public good.153 The Tenth Circuit’s
ruling limits government entities to two options when selling public
land.154 The first option is selling the land unencumbered. While doing so
generates fair market value for the land, it denies any possible future
public access to the land. The costs associated with selling the land are
also increased as leery buyers spend extra time and effort to make sure
the land is unencumbered. These increased costs are not only assumed by
the buyers but also passed onto government entities desiring to sell the
land.
Alternatively, public land can be sold with an easement at a deeply
discounted price. This discount results from the buyer giving up a stick
in their bundle of property rights, the right to exclude others. This option
however limits revenue that could be utilized in other areas to maximize
the public good. In either case, the ruling deprives states and individuals
the ability to negotiate and determine the scope of the easement that best
benefits both parties.
Not only is government’s ability to sell land burdened, its ability to
gain access across private individual’s lands is now hindered in the Tenth
150. Id. See also Mayor Ross C. “Rocky” Anderson, Regarding Main Street Plaza Proposal,
Dec.
6,
2002
available
at
http://www.slcgov.com/mayor/speeches/
Main%20Street%20Plaza%20Solution%20Proposal% 20Speech.htm (Salt Lake City Mayor Rocky
Anderson stated, “Salt Lake City government has a significant interest in preserving the beautiful,
peaceful setting provided by the Main Street Plaza. Not only do millions of tourists visit the area
each year, but also many Downtown workers and residents seek respite at the Plaza each day.”).
151. Rebecca Walsh, Main Street Closure Ready for Approval,, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 3,
1999, at D1 (Salt Lake City Planning Director Bill Wright stating that City did not have money to
build the plaza as “[i]t’s a very expensive proposition to build a plaza like this and maintain it.”).
152. U.S. Const. pmbl.
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2(1)(c)(2003) (city governments may “purchase, receive, hold,
sell, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the benefit of the municipality,
whether the property is within or without the municipality’s corporate boundaries”).
154. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the States of Utah, Alabama, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and
West Virginia, Corporation of the Presiding Bishopric of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City cert. denied (No. 02-1350).
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Circuit. Governments often negotiate with private individuals to gain
access to public land, beaches, and state hiking trails.155 Landowners will
not grant easements for public use if there is a possibility their property
will become a public forum. The Utah Attorney General, in an amicus
brief on behalf of several states, argued that
[P]roperty owners would be most reluctant to allow easements on their
property, particularly easements in favor of a government. Disregarding
the plain terms of the easement . . . impos[es] a disruptive public forum
on the Church Plaza. This is obviously a significant intrusion into the
City’s prerogative to dispose of its own property as it sees fit. But it is
also an enormous intrusion into the State’s authority to establish
property-law principles that will best serve the interests of the State and
its citizens.156

State governments in the Tenth Circuit are now faced with the challenge
of determining what servitudes they have already retained by deed that
violate the First Amendment. The ruling of First Unitarian has opened
up the door for other public servitudes to be deemed invalid. Under
settled state law, easements should only be utilized to the extent of “the
public purpose for which the easement was obtained,”157 and, in the
current case, the limitation was just for pedestrian passage. Regardless of
the intentions of the parties, terms of the easement, and the abridgment of
property rights the “First Amendment automatically injects an
irrevocable public forum clause in most government-owned public
access easements. To be sure, the court of appeals stated that it’s holding
did not mean that every easement creates a public forum.”158 Under the
Tenth circuit ruling:
[T]he result is extraordinary: even if the physical appearance and
primary use of a property have changed drastically, even if the property
has been sold for fair market value, and even if there are no identified
persons who will use the property as a thoroughfare, a public forum
will nevertheless exist any time a hypothetical person has the legal
ability to walk across that property.159

155.
156.
157.
pedestrian
forum”).
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 247-48 (Nev. 2001) (“[E]xistence of [a
access] easement alone, without more, does not transform private property into a public
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 154, at 9-10.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 8.
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C. First Unitarian Provides an Example of Unduly Burdening Public
Land
The problems associated with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling are evident
in the Main Street Plaza case. Salt Lake City began talking with the
Church over forty years earlier in an attempt to revitalize downtown
through turning Main Street into an extension of the Church’s downtown
campus.160 The purpose of the Plaza was to foster beauty and create
harmony to the City’s main tourist attraction; the Church’s Temple
Square and office building complex that straddle Main Street. It is argued
that annually more than nine million tourists visit the Church’s complex
downtown, generating a significant portion of the downtown economy.
During these talks, the Church made it clear that if the restrictions that
existed on its adjoining properties could not be imposed on the Main
Street Plaza, they would not enter into the deal. The City was never in a
position to turn the street into a park but relied upon the sale to the
Church to accomplish this goal. If the First Unitarian opinion were in
place during the Church and City’s negotiations, inevitably the Main
Street Plaza would never have been erected. The City and its citizens
would have lost a valuable downtown asset that consequently fulfilled
the purpose of increasing pedestrian traffic in addition to the revenue
generated through the sale.
As Nancy Workman, the Salt Lake County Mayor, pointed out:
Surely, the [C]hurch did not spend over $8 million to buy a piece of
property to serve as a platform for behavior it finds objectionable . . . .
No private entity would enter into a transaction such as that, so why
should the church be expected to? Let’s be fair. And let’s recognize the
value the plaza has added to our community.161

Additionally, nobody yet knows how far reaching the Tenth Circuit
ruling will be as the Main Street Plaza “public easement isn’t the only
right of way through private property in Salt Lake City.162 Other
easements are found crossing another Church owned property, a
downtown housing project, an outdoor shopping mall, and the back yards
of individuals.163 Two other easement contracts in particular contain
many of the same provisions in the Main Street Plaza reservation.164 The
Tenth Circuit ruling effectively opens the door for “those hostile to
160. Walsh, supra note 149.
161. Thomas Burr, Workman Backs LDS Plaza Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 25, 2002, at
C1.
162. Heather May, Other Owners With Public Right of Way Wonder if LDS Plaza Ruling
Affects Them, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 30, 2003, at A1.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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[private organizations] to forcibly open [private] church grounds,
gardens, camps, cemeteries, retreat centers and other private property for
antagonistic demonstrations and marches.”165 There is no certain way,
when contracting with a government entity for an easement across
private property, to avoid creating a public forum.
D. Resolution of the Easement Issue and the Continued Debate
The Tenth Circuit suggested that one solution to the problem would
be to eliminate the public easement.166 Accordingly, Salt Lake City and
the Church reached a settlement agreement where the Church bought the
rights to the easement for close to five million dollars in cash and land.167
This result is ironic in two ways. First, the Church, a fair market
purchaser, ended up paying more than fair market value and construction
costs to build a Plaza whose main purpose, identified by the Tenth
Circuit, was to increase the City’s pedestrian flow - - not for an
Ecclesiastical Park. Secondly, at the end of the day the City was willing
to give up what supposedly the Tenth Circuit argued was the City’s
purpose in the Plaza, that of an easement.
But this settlement agreement has not ended the controversy. On
August 3, 2003 the First Unitarian Church voted unanimously to file
another lawsuit. The underlying arguments in this new lawsuit is that the
city selling the right of way across the Plaza violated individuals First
amendment rights as well “as the ban on endorsement of religion found
in the U.S. and Utah constitutions.”168 The suit claims that President
Gordon B. Hinckley used religious code to improperly influence city
councilmen to vote for the selling of the easement and that Mayor Rocky
Anderson yielded to the Church’s influence in order to “shore up his
flagging support” on the west side of the City where the Church gave
property to the City.169 However, as an editorial noticed
[t]he irony is too rich to ignore. Before casting a vote Sunday over
whether to sue Salt Lake City for selling its public easement on the
Main Street Plaza, leaders of the First Unitarian Church expelled
everyone who isn’t a member of the congregation. Even the media had
to wait outside in silence for nearly two hours until the vote . . . was
165. Id. (quoting Martin Nussbaum a Colorado Attorney who represented fifteen organizations
in a brief in opposition to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in First Unitarian).
166. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1132
(10th Cir. 2002).
167. Josh Loftin & Brady Snyder, Main St. Plaza Deal Done, DESERET NEWS, July 29, 2003,
at A1.
168. City Wants ACLU Main Street Plaza Lawsuit Tossed, AP, August 29, 2003, available at
http://tv.ksl.com/index.php?nid=5&sid=45460.
169. Id.
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made known. Wait a second. Does this mean churches do have a right
to suspend First Amendment rights on their own property? Well, of
course they do.170

The ongoing dispute over the Plaza typifies the real dispute in First
Unitarian, the underlying tensions over the Church’s influence in Salt
Lake City.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the restrictions placed upon the Plaza would survive the
non-public forum reasonableness standard is unclear and not addressed
in this Note. Regardless of the tension between the Church and other
factions, one thing is certain from the Tenth Circuits ruling, by ignoring
the intent of the parties through the deed of reservation and by limiting
its analysis of the Plaza only to the easement, the court incorrectly
classified the Main Street Plaza as a public forum and has created
uncertainty within Tenth Circuit property law. The right to exclude
others might be included in the bundle of property rights, but in the
Tenth Circuit, private property owners subject to government regulation
and servitudes best beware.
Braden J. Montierth

170. Main Street Saga Continues, DESERET NEWS, August 5, 2003, at A10.

